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The bulk of philosophical/ethica l di scuss ion about forgiveness emphasizes 
the importance of narrowing down the concept by defining bas ic elements 
or characteri stics, or spec ify ing conditions or good reasons in support of 
the act of forgiveness. The goa l is to determine when fo rgiveness is 
complete and ethica l or not. Forgiveness has been portrayed as an either/or 
sort of phenomenon. Very little attention has been given to what has been 
called the process of forgiving, I I in tend to deve lop the idea of a process 
by showing that fo rgiving may be best ex plained in terms of a range or 
continuum of forgiving. I will describe forgiving as an attitude with a bas ic 
structure that allows for stages with di fferent degrees of mastery of 
negative feelings and di fferent leve ls of understanding of ethica l reasons 
that j usti fy the process, I will show that "try in g to forgive" may in fact 
constitute the first step, both logica lly and psychologica lly, in the forgivi ng 
J process: 
The Welch Case 
Consider Bud Welch ' s agony over what should be done to Tim 
McVeigh for causing the death of hi s daughter and 167 other victims in the 
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. Welch is quoted as say ing: 
McVeigh shouldn ' t get off easy. Lock him lip for good, with no 
chance to get Ollt. Is that puni shment enough? The part of me that 
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still screams "kill him" doesn't think so. But my Catholicism 
teaches that even he has a soul, and we must at least try to save him. 
I'm still too angry to deal with that now. But I'll have to be 
forgiving if I am to have peace. That would be harder if he is 
executed. I don't want McVeigh's death on my head. A lady from 
Texas called me and said her husband had been murdered. After his 
killer was executed, she began to feel guilty. She thought knowing 
the murderer was dead would help ease her grief but it didn't - and I 
don't think it would help me, either. 
I am not trying to win converts. I just want people to think hard 
about the costs of the death penalty. Killing McVeigh won't bring 
my daughter back. The only way I can go on is to continue to 
believe in the sanctity of life - even a mass murderer's.) 
Welch apparently feels that his anger is still getting in the way of 
forgiveness. I would like to suggest that Welch's reliance on values he 
learned as a Catholic, saving a soul and sanctity of life, indicate he has 
already taken the minimal first step in the forgiving process. 
The First Step of Forgiving 
For purposes of this article, forgiving will be described as an 
attitude shaped in response to injury inflicted on oneself and/or one's 
family or close friends.4 The forgiver must be aware that moral wrong was 
done by an individual , or individuals, who was responsible for the act and 
is the object of forgiving. 5 This awareness, however, should be based on 
objective fact as far as possible to avoid subjective fabrication or projection 
on the forgiver ' S part. 
The forgiver also experiences an emotional response to the 
wrongdoing. Negative emotions nearly always constitute the first line of 
defense against inflicted injury . Ever since Joseph Butler6, the 
philosophical literature has concentrated on resentment as the most potent 
and debilitating of the negative emotions. Robert Solomon characterizes 
resentment as the "villain of the passions. It is among the most obsessive 
and enduring of the emotions, poisoning the whole of subjectivity with its 
venom ... ,,7 But other feelings may accompany an injury, singly or in 
combination, as mentioned by various authors: hatred, bitterness, hostility, 
outrage, contempt, indignation, averSIOn, anger, sadness, or 
disappointment. 
The above presuppositions describe the relevant background 
against which an individual may make a two-fold decision that forms the 
basic structure of a forgiving attitude. The first decision is negative, to 
refrain from inflicting injury in return for wrong done. Welch, for 
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example, appears to have decided not to seek personal revenge. Nor does 
he think that the state should kill the wrongdoer on his behalf. The 
decision to personally forgo retaliation is necessary but not sufficient to 
distinguish an intention to forgive from an intention to seek revenge. An 
additional intention seems necessary to give a positive focus to the 
individual's attitude toward the wrongdoer. As a bare minimum, it would 
seem that another feature of the structure of forgiving would have to draw 
upon the forgiver's general attitude of goodwill towards others and have 
some aspect of that focused on the wrongdoer. I contend that Welch ' s 
references to McVeigh's soul and the sanctity of life are evidence of a 
minimum of goodwill already extended toward McVeigh and a decision of 
Welch to commit to do more over time. Unlike others who have been 
quoted in the press, Welch does not vilify McVeigh as a degenerate animal , 
as one who does not deserve to live, who has forfeited all human rights . 
Another survivor gives voice to such a vengeful attitude: " I don ' t want 
McVeigh to have the freedom to even get a drink of water in his cell."g 
Even though Welch has not yet worked out his personal feelings toward 
McVeigh and has not found the peace of mind he is longing for, he seems 
to illustrate a first step in the process of forgiving. He already possesses the 
goodwill that can spur further changes in the way he thinks and feels and 
acts towards McVeigh . 
Recognizing the need to forgive is already a stage in the forgiving 
process. The stage may be characterized as ethical to the extent that the 
forgiver also has a sense that a good reason is necessary to justify the 
forgiving. Welch eventually may draw upon his Catholic background to 
supply him with a ready source of credible moral concepts and reasoning. 
But even before he explores this resource in more depth, if he does, it may 
be possible to identify in him an initial awareness that manifests the bare 
minimum of justification for forgiving . He seems to possess, at the very 
least, an intuitive sense that it is the right thing to do, to personally do no 
harm to the wrongdoer and to try to do some good that acknowledges that 
the wrongdoer still has some moral standing in the community. 
This initial awareness suggests a posture of openness and 
willingness to explore the forgiving path. My thesis is that this posture 
already is a part of, not just preliminary to, the process of forgiving. This 
posture may serve as the general framework that gives initial structure to 
the process of ethical forgiving. Overall evaluation of an individual ' s 
response to wrongdoing depends on such variables as the sincerity of the 
goodwill intention, the quality and duration of negative feelings , the quality 
and depth of self-awareness and reflectiveness about moral reasons, the 
strength of commitment to act, and the consistency of action. But on the 
whole, evaluation must bear on the life story that recounts the process of 
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response to a case of wrongdoing rather than a single decision or act of the 
forgiver. The phrase, " trying to forgive", may well sum up, not someone 
who has yet to make up their mind to forgive, but rather the story of 
someone in the process of forgiving and also struggling as long as it takes 
to reach closure. The phrase, " trying to forgive", also implies that in some 
cases forgiving lasts a lifetime and closure is never complete.9 
Negative Feelings 
The process model sketched above suggests that the initial attitude 
of goodwill toward the wrongdoer is consistent with the process of some 
negative feelings in the forgiver, in the beginning and perhaps throughout 
the forgiving process. Thus, Welch can be angry but still want some good 
for the wrongdoer. Over the long run , however, one measure of the 
sincerity of an individual' s attention to show goodwill is success in coming 
to terms with one ' s feelings so that one can find some inner peace lO, but 
also so that one can avoid jeopardizing one ' s relationship or connection 
with the wrongdoer and one"s role in the ongoing life of the community. In 
most cases, hopefully, the forgiver can gradually diminish unwanted 
feelings that are destructive of self and others. I I But even in the worst case 
scenario, when feelings cannot be overcome entirely, acts of forgiving have 
ethical value if there prevails an intention to show the wrongdoer some 
goodwill and there is sincere effort to act in accordance with this intention. 
H.J.N . Horsbrugh, one of the few to characterize forgiveness as a 
process, shares with many authors the view that forgiveness is the complete 
overcoming of negative feelings. Even though he distinguishes between 
the original volition to forgive that begins the process and the level of 
achievement which may take time, he clearly places emphasis on the ideal , 
the point of fruition when all negative feelings are, in his words, 
"extirpated ." He compares this to hitting the bull's-eye. But the 
impression is that he is thinking of a kind of competition in which a person 
has one or a limited number of arrows to shoot, and hitting the bull is what 
wins the prize. In my model , the analogy is more like developing a virtue 
that includes commitment to practice as long as it takes to master the skill 
of consistently hitting the target and perhaps over time finding the bull 
more often than not. In the best case scenario, in a particular practice 
session, one hits the bull repeatedly and then feel s no further need to be on 
the archery range. This illustrates reaching the point of having managed to 
control one's feelings satisfactorily in one specific case of forgiving. Then 
the person only returns to the archery range the next time one is called to be 
forgiving. If the virtue of forgiving is well-developed, it may take less time 
to get back into the groove of being consistently on target. My ve rsion of 
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the archery analogy seems more realistic and is comparable to other 
challenging situations that require us to continuously struggle, as we seek 
to reaffirm our initial resolve to show goodwill to others and keep our 
caring skills sharp. Rare is the occasion when we experience the 
"spontaneous reversal of feeling" that Horsbrugh says can occur when the 
decision to forgive in a quarrel between old friends happens almost 
automatically.12 Horsbrugh and others would have us aspire to this ideal , 
but then warn us that failure to achieve the ideal means forgiveness is not 
yet within our grasp. My view is that the intention to show the wrongdoer 
some goodwill itself provides a minimum of ethical integrity to forgiving, 
both in its beginning stage and throughout the process, however long it 
takes. 
J.G. Haber offers an alternative to Horsbrugh when he argues that a 
key element defining the meaning of forgiveness is the sincere intention to 
will away resentment. The expression, " I forgive you," among other 
things, must mean that the individual actually has overcome resentment. 
This agrees with Horsbrugh ' s position . Or, " I forgive you" may mean that 
the individual "is at least willing to try to overcome it [resentment]. " I) This 
second meaning is consistent with the model I am advocating above The 
intention to show goodwill should include a commitment to overcome 
resentment. Haber, however, does not acknowledge that other negative 
feelings need to be included in such a commitment. Nor is he willing to 
grant that forgiveness has moral status based on such a commitment. He 
argues that the only sufficient reason that makes forgiveness amoral act is 
sincere repentance on the part of the wrongdoer. Again, this seems to focus 
on a particular ideal that may define what constitutes "authentic" 
forgiveness , the fullness of realization of forgiveness . My concern is to 
show that we need to develop a minimal meaning for moral forgiving 
which serves as a general form that can manifest different degrees of 
realization depending on level of mastery of negative feelings, whatever 
they may be, and depending 011 the quality of reasons used to justify the 
forgiving as ethical. 
Ethical Reasons that Justify Forgiving 
The foundational reason advocated in this paper for determining 
what is ethical is the general intention to show goodwill to the wrongdoer. 
Further specification and expansion of this reason is possible by integrating 
one or more reason s elaborated on in different models of ethical forgiving 
found in the literature. 
Welch ' s allusion to peace of mind suggests that egocentric reasons 
may dominate at an early stage in the forgiving process. But self-
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preservation is not necessarily incompatible with goodwill unless a sense of 
altruism is virtually absent. It might be absent if a person were to say " I 
forgive you," and have in mind: " I just can't stand the hurt of it anymore 
and want to be done with it," or " I need to get rid of the guilt I feel in not 
forgiving." If no element of goodwill is present in the individual ' s 
awareness and intention, then it seems that even though the word 
" forgiveness" is uttered (or thought), the basic meaning of the concept, at 
least as I have articulated it, does not apply and use of the term is 
inappropriate. 
Most of the philosophical literature goes beyond egocentric reasons 
and stresses the larger goals of reconciliation and restoring/building the 
moral community as the basis for good reasons that justify ethical 
forgiving. My purpose in summarizing some of the options below is not to 
defend a particular model but only to show that the minimal approach that I 
am developing is consistent with all of the models. My thesis is that 
forgiving admits of degrees, of which one dimension i the quality of the 
ethical reasons cited to justify a process of forgiving actions. Most of the 
discussion in the literature has grappled with how to adjudicate such 
quality and determine the best model. I will group these models under two 
approaches, one which emphasizes self-reform of the forgiver, and the 
other the transformation of the wrongdoer. 
Self-Reform of the Forgiver 
Joseph Butler and many others call for keeping a tight reign on 
resentment and other negative emotions so that constructive relationships 
can be maintained. 14 Others see a need for a change of heart in the 
forgiver. Jean Hampton asks us to see the wrongdoer in a new light, in 
effect to separate the sin from the sinner as Augustine suggested. IS 
Cheshire Calhoun challenges us to show respec t for wrongdoers by 
sympathetically entering into their life hi stories and stop demanding that 
they be different from what they are. 16 Joanna North contends that a willed 
change of heart is the key to restoring damage done to relationships .17 
Appeals to humility, characteristically found in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, tend to encourage un i lateral forgivcness. 18 As individuals reflect 
on their own moral history, they realize that they have been in need of 
forgiveness , have been forgiven , and so should forgive others, even to the 
point of " forgiveness of enemies. ,1'1 Self-transformation, of course, also 
may have the positive effect of facilitating transformation of the 
wrongdoer. Forgiveness as proof of love may be more powerful than 
punishment in touching the heart of the wrongdoer, according to Hastings 
Rashdall. 20 
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In sum these self-reform models tend to view forgiveness as 
unconditional and unilateral. They often refer to respect for others and 
love and compassion as operative principles or virtues to achieve 
reintegration of the wrongdoer into a relationship or into the community. 
Transformation of the Wrongdoer 
Repentance has received the most attention in models that require 
signs of transformation of the wrongdoer to justify forgiveness . Regret and 
the promise to do no wrong in the future are the basic elements of 
repentance cited. Haber sees repentance as necessary to " negate the 
justifiability of the injured party' s resentment," and to preserve the victim ' s 
self-respect. 21 John Wilson shows that repentance is a means to 
reconciliation since it restores a kind of equality between the wrongdoer 
and the forgiver based on "norms of fair play.,,22 If you don ' t play by the 
rules of a relationship or society, then you have to pay a penalty. Justice-
related reasons may include references to the humiliation and suffering 
a lready experienced by the wrongdoer. 2:l 
The Welch case suggests a transformation model based on the 
Catholic idea of satisfaction or penance. In the Sacrament of Penance or 
Reconciliation, the wrongdoers receive abso lution after confess ing sins, but 
must commit to restoring their spiritual health. Doing penance is the means 
and, in the words of the New Calholic Catechism, may "consist of prayer, 
an offering, works of mercy, se rvice of [sic] neighbor, voluntary self-
denial, sacrifices, and above all the patient acceptance of the cross we must 
bear [that is, to assoc iate oneself with the suffering and death of Christ].,,24 
Justice as well may demand repair of the harm done by means of 
compensation for injuries, etc. 
Transformation models also may focus on the future potential of 
wrongdoers. Hannah Arendt argues that forgiveness is necessary to 
counter " the predicament of irreversibility. ,,25 Persons cannot move 
forward in their li ves, in case or serious wrongdoing, if we cannot be 
released from the consequences of their deeds. 
Model s that require tran sformation of the wrongdoer tend to view 
forgiveness as cond itional and bilateral. They refer to mutual respect and 
justice as the principles necessary for restoring a sense of community 
among moral equals. 
Conclusion 
This paper has outlined a position that defines ethical forgiving as a 
process guided primarily by an intention to show goodwill to the 
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wrongdoer. The va lue of thi s approach is that it fits with commonsense 
experience that forgiving, like other forms of action involving commitment, 
admits of degrees of realization. This approach avoids the problems of 
exclusiveness and re lativi sm re lated to other model s. Many models of 
forgiveness describe an exclusive ideal standard that leaves little room for 
our ordinary experience of progress ing (and sometimes regress ing) through 
stages of development from lower through higher leve ls of ethical 
forgiving. With a deve lopment mode l, our intuition is that we can function 
ethically even while struggling with our fee lings and while trying to sort 
out our reasoning. Other commentators suggest that the term forgiveness 
defies easy categorization because it has as many meanings as individuals 
use it to mean . This re lativi stic approach only serves to confuse 
forg iveness with other concepts like mercy, pardon, condonation , 
absolution, excuse, exoneration, and leniency; and in the extreme, 
forgi veness even has been construed as a form of retaliation.16 My pos ition 
makes the modest claim that forgiving inc ludes a core meaning that can 
accommodate definitions of th e idea l at one end o f a continuum and the 
first minimal step of ethical forgiving at the other. But there is an 
identifiable continuum that clearly differentiates forgiving from other 
related concepts. 
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